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NOTES
LoVELL . POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT: AN
ELEMIENTARY LESSON AGAINST JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
IN SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR DISCIPLINARY DISCRETION
INTRODUCTION

A high school guidance counselor, accustomed to dealing with students'
frustrations during class scheduling appointments, is taken aback when an
irritable 15-year-old sophomore sitting in her office declares, "If you don't

give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you!"' Angered that their
child is suspended for threatening a teacher, the parents bring an action in
federal court on behalf of their daughter for free speech and due process

violations. A United States district court must now face the task of sorting
out where school administrator discretion ends and federal judicial intervention begins.
In deciding whether the student should prevail in such a scenario, the
court must consider whether such an utterance is protected by the free speech
provisions of the First Amendment.2 But it must also consider whether it
should limit normally protected speech, given the unique needs of a school
environment.3 In the wake of the famed Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

Community School District directive that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate,"4 courts have lacked consistency in interpreting the free speech rights
of schoolchildren. 5 As a result, the courts have also differed on how much

discretion to afford local school officials.6

1. These facts stem from Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90
F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996), discussed infra.
2. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging ...
freedom of speech..." U.S. CONST. amend I.
3. See Larry Bartlett & Linda Frost, The Closing of the School House Gates: Increasing
Restrictions on the Public School Student's Exercise of Speech and Expression, 16 T. MARSHALL
L. REv. 311 (1991) (describing the tension between freedom of thought and speech and the
state's competing interest of meeting its educational mission).
4. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). The Supreme Court held that high school students were
entitled to their First Amendment rights to wear armbands to express their political opposition
to the American involvement in the Vietnam War.
5. See David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against
JudicialIntervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 487 (1981), for a criticism of Tinker's standard of
judicial intervention, evidenced by the fallout of post-Tinker cases with contradictory holdings.
See also Ralph D. Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Free Speech and Public Education: An
Overview of Legal, Social, and Political Issues, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 873, 875 (1985).
("Although not every utterance or public display is deserving of constitutional protection, judicial
attempts at providing guidelines have been far from clear.")
6. Diamond, supra note 5, at 487.
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A recent case in the Ninth Circuit, based on the facts above, evidences
the confusion created when a federal court attempts to strike the delicate
balance between a schoolchild's free speech rights at school with the interest
of the school board in maintaining discipline. In an unexplained about-face,
the Ninth Circuit reversed its own earlier decision in Lovell By and Through
Lovell v. Poway Unified School District.7 The Ninth Circuit's second
decision found that a suburban San Diego high school that had suspended a
student for making a potentially threatening statement to her counselor had
not violated the student's free speech rights after all.8 The contradiction in
the reasoning of the two decisions9 reflects the hurdles the Ninth Circuit
faced. The court had to reconcile Supreme Court decisions that have limited
schoolchildren's free speech rights in the school with a recent California
statute ,' that explicitly gives high school students on campus the same free
speech rights they have off campus. Along with avoiding the question of
how much deference to afford local school administrators, the Ninth
Circuit bypassed the substantive issues in its second decision by holding that
Lovell's statement was a true threat-and therefore not protected by the
Constitution in any forum. 2
The Lovell court, in restructuring its factual conclusion to avoid the hardto-resolve legal principles, has done an injustice to the educational system by
failing to give clear legal rules for educators to follow. Given the increase
of violence in the schools, teachers and administrators are concerned not only
about their own immediate safety,"3 but also about more amorphous
discipline issues that contribute to an unsafe environment. Does the
California statute protect students who address their teachers in a manner that
is not adjudged to be a true threat, but that is potentially threatening or
defiant nonetheless?
A number of commentators have addressed the balancing of student
rights and state interests in the context of Fourth Amendment searches and

7. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir.
1996).
8. In its prior decision, the Ninth Circuit had held that the student's free speech rights had
been violated. See infra note 9.
9. The earlier Lovell decision, 1996 WL 140805 (9th Cir. March 29, 1996), was withdrawn
a little more than two months later. See Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., 1996 WL 304396 (9th Cir. June 7, 1996). The Court issued the revised decision, 90 F.3d
317 (9th Cir. July 18, 1996), a month later.
10. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950 (West 1992). See infra note 30 for the relevant text of this
statute.
11. Since the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case, the Supreme Court has found
consistently that education is one of the most important functions of local government. 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954). See also Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), discussed
infra in Part V.
12. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372-73.
13. The Supreme Court recognized even in 1985 that in recent years, "school disorder has
often taken particularly ugly forms." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). Part
V of this Note discusses such school violence in more detail.
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seizures. 4 Other scholars have examined the First Amendment rights of
students where the speech involved Tinker-style political expression. 5
However, little scholarly treatment exists on the status of defiant speech that

might be protected by the First Amendment if it were uttered on the street,
but that constitutionally may be limited on campus. 6

This Note examines the challenges which the Ninth Circuit faced as it
decided the Lovell case. It argues that the limitations on Lovell's speech

were justified, even if one were to determine that her statement was
constitutionally protected because it was not a true threat. Part I discusses the

unique history of the Lovell decisions, specifically focusing on the.confusion
created by the contradictory factual conclusions of the Ninth Circuit. Part II
reviews the Tinker case, compares the constitutional free speech rights of
children to those of adults, and then argues that limitations on such rights are

justified in the school context. Part I reviews the post-Tinker decisions that
have limited schoolchildren's speech on campus. Part IV critiques the 1992
California statute invoked in Lovell, 7 suggesting that the statute is poorly
drafted because First Amendment analysis cannot properly be performed
without consideration of the forum in which the speech occurs. Part V
addresses the issue of school administrator discretion versus students' rights
and judicial intervention. Included in this delicate balance is a consideration

of the duty of administrators to provide a safe environment for students and
teachers. In addition, Part V argues that courts should afford local adminis-

trators liberal discretion within constitutional bounds.

14. The leading case on the constitutionality of public school searches is New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (lowering the threshold requirement for conducting a search in
order to balance students' privacy rights with school administrators' interests). More recently,
in Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), the Supreme Court found that
a student athlete random drug testing policy did not violate a student's Fourth Amendment
rights. For critical treatment of the search and seizure issue in the schools, see Jaqueline A.
Stefkonovich, Students' Fourth and FourteenthAmendment Rights After Tinker: A Half Full
Glass, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 481 (1995); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Testing: The
Impact of Action, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 349 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Bartlett & Frost, supra note 3; Mawdsley & Permuth, supra note 5; and
Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student
Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 379 (1995).
16. Scholarly treatments that touch on the issue of potentially threatening speech, but do
not examine school administrator discretion versus judicial intervention, include Alison Myhra,
The Hate Speech Conundrum and the Public Schools, 68 N.D. L. REv. 71 (1992); Barbara E.
Smith & Sharon Goretsky Elstein, Effective Ways to Reduce School Victimization: Practicaland
Legal Concerns, 14 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 22 (1993); and Jonathan Wren, Note,
Alternative Schools For Disruptive Youths: A Cure for What Ails School Districts Plagued by
Violence?, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307 (1995).
17. See infra note 30 for the text of CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(a) (West 1992).
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I. THE LOVELL V. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DI&TRICT ABOUT-FACE
A. The Facts of Lovell
The difficulty of determining the scope of public school students' free
speech rights on campus is well illustrated by a recent Ninth Circuit case,
Lovell v. Poway Unified School District.8 This case began in a principal's
office and eventually made its way before the Ninth Circuit twice (and almost
three times).9
After being shuffled back and forth between various administrators in
search of a scheduling change, 15-year-old Sarah Lovell wound up in her
school counselor's office. When she learned that the classes she had been
signed up for were full,2" Lovell reportedly said to her counselor, "If you
' Alarmed by
don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you!"21
Lovell's tone of voice and demeanor, the counselor later filled out a school
referral form and reported the statement as a disciplinary incident to the
assistant principal.22 After holding a meeting with Lovell to determine the
gravity of the incident, the school's assistant principal suspended her for three
days.23 The school also included a report of the incident in Lovell's
permanent record.24
Apparently dismayed by this record's negative
characterization of his daughter's behavior,25 Lovell's father sued the school
board on behalf of his daughter in federal court, alleging both free speech and
due process violations.2 6 By requesting federal court intervention, Lovell's

18. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. July

18; 1996).
19. The plaintiff in Lovell was denied a petition to be heard en banc before the Ninth
Circuit on August 30, 1996. Had the petition for rehearing been granted, the case would have
appeared before the Ninth Circuit for a third time.
20. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 369. In search of a scheduling change, Lovell had waited in line to
see her counselor, who told her to see another administrator. The second administrator placed
Lovell in the classes she wanted and sent her back to her counselor. After standing in line
again, the counselor told Lovell that the classes were full after all.
21. Maintaining that she merely had said, "I'm so angry, I could just shoot someone," the
student argued throughout the proceedings that she was merely using a figure of speech. Id.
22. Id. at 373 n.5. Since the counselor had to continue to meet with students, she did not
tell the school assistant principal about the incident until several hours later. The plaintiff
argued that this delay proved that the counselor did not feel threatened.
23. Relying on Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the magistrate later determined that
no due process violation had occurred in this proceeding. Lovell By and Through Lovell v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 780, 785 (S.D. Cal. 1994). The administrator had met
Goss's minimum due process requirements when a student is suspended for less than ten days,
including notice and an opportunity to refute the allegations. In addition, California's statutory
requirements to ensure procedural fairness had been met. Id. The procedural due process issue
was not raised on appeal and is not the focus of this Note.
24. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 369-70.
25. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 140805, at *2
(9th Cir. March 29, 1996) (withdrawn).
26. Lovell, 847 F. Supp. at 780.
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father bypassed the administrative appeals process within the Poway Unified
School District and the California Department of Education.27
B. The Magistrateas FactFinder
In a bench trial that lasted three days,2" the magistrate heard evidence

and testimony that exceeded what had been available to the assistant

principal.29 The judge determined that the school administrators had
violated Lovell's right to free speech, as guaranteed by California Education
Code Section 4895030 (hereinafter "Section 48950") and the First Amendment.31 Applying the tests of United States v. Kelner3 2 and United States
v. Orozco-Santillan33 (neither of which involved threats by students), the
magistrate determined that Lovell's statement did not constitute a threat, and
was therefore constitutionally protected.3 4 Even though both of the precedent cases involved adult criminal defendants, the magistrate found that their
standards provided a "great deal of guidance" in determining whether Lovell's
statement was a threat. The court held that Lovell's words did not convey

27. All students within the Poway Unified School District receive written notice of Uniform
Complaint Procedures, including appeals to the Regional Area Superintendent, the District's
Board of Education, and the California Department of Education, in that order. See Poway
Unified School District Annual Notification of Uniform Complaint Procedures form (on file with
author).
28. Rex Bossart, Court Reverses Ruling, Limits Student Speech, L.A. DAILY J.,July 19,
1996, at 8.
29. The assistant principal had followed the required state procedures when she had held
a short meeting with Lovell. Such an informal proceeding is not nearly as exhaustive as a fullblown adjudication before a federal magistrate.
30. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(a) (West 1992) provides:
School districts operating one or more high schools and private secondary
schools shall not make or enforce any rule subjecting any high school pupil to
disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is speech or other
communication that, when engaged in outside of the campus, is protected from
governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
or Section 2 of Article 1 of the California Constitution.
31. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 780, 785
(S.D. Cal. 1994). The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging ... freedom of speech. . ." U.S. CONST. amend I.
32. 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that defendant's threat to assassinate a
foreign political leader was not constitutionally protected) (citing Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 708 (1969)). The Second Circuit held that statements are not threats unless they
"convey a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution" in their language and context.
33. 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant's threat to a federal law
enforcement officer was not constitutionally protected). The Ninth Circuit found that threats
should be judged by an objective standard-"whether a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault."
34. Lovell, 847 F. Supp. at 784-85.
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a "gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution, nor the intent to harm or
assault."3
C. The Ninth Circuit'sAbout-face
In its first decision, which it later withdrew,36 the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's decision.37 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has
narrowed the First Amendment speech rights of students in recent years, but
noted that the California Legislature has expanded those rights. 31 Interpreting Section 48950, 31 the court concluded that the Legislature intended to
protect such speech as Lovell's, because the statute gives high school student
speech the same protection on campus as such speech has off campus.40
Along with criticizing the intervention of a federal court in a local school
board matter, Judge Noonan in dissent feared the floodgates of litigation that
would open by usurping the authority of local school administrators: "This
needless excursion into school discipline invites litigation under the California
Education Code into a federal forum with a federally-awarded [sic] fee for
the lawyers who win."'
In response to the first Ninth Circuit decision, the school board filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.42 But before the
plaintiffs could file a response, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its earlier decision
without explanation. 3 One month later, in July 1996, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court's decision in an opinion that did not reference its
earlier contrary ruling.44

The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit's second Lovell opinion differed
completely from its earlier decision. In its second decision, the court noted
that Section 48950 expands the constitutional protections guaranteed by the

35. Id. at 785. In arriving at its decision, the magistrate noted that Lovell had not acted
in a physically threatening manner when she had spoken to the counselor several times that day.
He also considered the counselor's delay in seeking assistance from the principal. Id.
36. See supra note 9.
37. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 140805 (9th Cir.
March 29, 1996) (withdrawn). The Ninth Circuit reached its decision despite arguments by the
school board that the trial court incorrectly substituted its own opinion for the conclusion reached
by the assistant principal. Specifically, the school board argued that the magistrate should have
limited its role to deciding whether the facts available to the assistant principal at the time
provided substantial evidence to support her finding. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.'s Petition for
Cert. to the U.S. Sup. Ct. 10 (October 1995 Term) (withdrawn petition, on file with author).
38. Lovell, 1996 WL 140805, at *4 (withdrawn).
39. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950 (West 1992). See supra note 30.
40. Lovell, 1996 WL 140805, at *6 (withdrawn).
41. Id. at *11 (withdrawn) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
42. Interview with Christopher Welsh, attbmey for the Poway Unified School District in
the Lovell case (September 10, 1996).
43. See supra note 9.
44. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. July
18, 1996).
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First Amendment.4"

The court then held that the district court "implicitly

and inappropriately allowed the California Education Code to trump federal

constitutional law. ' 6 Regardless, the court concluded that the student's
speech was a threat under both federal and state law.47 Contrary to its first
decision, the reversing Lovell court held that a reasonable person in the
48
counselor's shoes would have felt threatened by the student's statement.
Significantly, the court here failed to include its earlier elaborate analysis of
the applicable California statute. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit concluded that its
earlier first-impression interpretation of a recent California statute was better
left to the state courts.49
The Ninth Circuit did provide additional clues, however, on why it
reversed itself. At least four times in the opinion, the court made comments
on the level of violence that exists in the schools such as the following: "In
light of the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified

in taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other students."5'

By comparison, the court had raised no concerns about violence in the earlier
opinion. Perhaps the reevaluation of violence in the schools led to the court's
change of position."' Yet the court stopped short of addressing whether the

courts should give school administrators more discretion, given this increase
in violence.
In any event, the Ninth Circuit avoided some of the more difficult

substantive issues which the court itself had raised in its first opinion by
changing its view of the facts. By finding in its second decision that Lovell's
statement was a true threat, the court did not have to analyze the impact of

Supreme Court cases and the 1992 California statute on defiant but nonthreat-

45. The court cited the following cases to support its argument that the First Amendment
guarantees only limited protection for student speech in the school context: Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); and Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
682 (1986).
46. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 372. Specifically, the court found that the magistrate had stated the applicable
law, but had misapplied the law to the facts. Unlike the magistrate, the court here based its
conclusions on the counselor's characterization of the student's statement, since the plaintiff had
not met her burden of proving her "figure of speech" version of the statement. Id. at 373.
49. As will be discussed infra, the Ninth Circuit recognized the problems created by this
newly passed California statute. For example, the court noted that the statute expanded free
speech rights of students, which contradicts the trend in the federal courts to limit students' free
speech rights. Also, the Ninth Circuit wished to avoid interpreting this California statute on first
impression. Judge Noonan alluded to this concern in his partial dissent to the Lovell reversal:
"The scope of this recently enacted statute [California Education Code § 48950] will no doubt
be narrowed in the courts of California, but this task is better left in the first instance to those
courts." Lovell, 90 F.3d at 374 (Noonan, J., partially dissenting).
50. Id. at 372. The opinion then cited United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659
(1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting), which noted that "the problem of guns in and around schools is
widespread and extremely serious," as "four percent of American high school students... carry
a gun to school at least occasionally." Id.
51. The impact of violence on the schools will be addressed in Part V of this Note.
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ening speech. As the magistrate correctly reasoned, both the Supreme Court
cases and Section 48950 lead to the same conclusion that true threats are
never 'constitutionally protected.52 While seemingly the coward's way out
of a difficult legal straightjacket created by the California Legislature, the
Ninth Circuit decision, in the end, makes good sense and good law. The final
resolution of this case also illustrates that an administrator is a better judge
of the facts than a magistrate, who is far removed from the unique school
environment.
Even if the Ninth Circuit had concluded that Lovell's statement was not
a threat, Supreme Court cases since Tinker would nonetheless permit
restriction of Lovell's speech. The more difficult issue arises in trying to
reconcile the constitutional status of schoolchildren's speech with the status
of such speech under the California statute.53
II. THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE AND THE CONSnTUTIONAL FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS OF SCHOOLCHILDREN

A. The Tinker Standard
Both of the Ninth Circuit Lovell decisions recognized that the Supreme
Court has limited the First Amendment rights of students in the school
context.54 This Part examines Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, an early student speech case, to determine the constitutional
status of schoolchildren's speech. Such an analysis will set the stage for then
critiquing Section 48950, which may, on one interpretation, ignore the
limitations that Supreme Court cases have placed on such speech. Understanding that the Tinker standard by itself is inapplicable in a Lovell scenario
is especially significant, since the California Legislature relied on Tinker in
drafting the statute that will be criticized in Part IV below.
While the United States Constitution guarantees the protection of First
Amendment rights to all citizens, 55 these protections -may be limited for
some groups of people in certain circumstances.56 Viewing children as such
a group, the Supreme Court had not formally recognized that children in
school are entitled to First Amendment speech rights prior to the 1969 Tinker

52. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 780, 784
(S.D. Cal 1994).
53. See Part IV for a critique of CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950 (West 1992).
54. Lovell, 1996 WL 140805, at *4 (9th Cir. March 29, 1996) (withdrawn); 90 F.3d 367,
371 (9th Cir. July 18, 1996).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. Bartlett & Frost, supra note 3, at 311-12 ("When liberty of speech conflicts with other
important values, it may be restricted.").
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decision. 7 In fact, just prior to Tinker, in Ginsberg v. State of New York,
the Supreme Court had found that "a child.., is not possessed of that full
capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.""8
By contrast, the Supreme Court in Tinker upheld the First Amendment
rights of public school students to wear black armbands in protest of the
American involvement in the Vietnam conflict. 9 The Court found that
"First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special circumstances of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students."6 In finding
that students did not shed their rights to freedom of speech at the "schoolhouse gate," and in speaking of student's rights in the same breath as
teacher's rights, the Court in essence elected to treat the school campus as a
public space. Recognizing the interests of schools in avoiding large
disruptions, however, the Tinker standard also provided that students could
engage in such political expression as long as they did not "materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operations of the school" nor "impinge upon the rights" of other students.6
While the scope of this standard engendered contradictory holdings in
subsequent lower court decisions,62 it remained the only authoritative
guidance for school free speech rights analysis until the Supreme Court
6 3 in 1986.
decided Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser
B. The ConstitutionalStatus of Schoolchildren'sSpeech
Some commentators praised the Tinker decision for guaranteeing
students' free flow of ideas in the marketplace.64 But the Tinker decision
also drew much criticism because the Court for the first time appeared to
equate the free speech rights of children on campus with those of children,
and even adults, on the street. Moreover, as Professor Diamond explains in
57. Prior Supreme Court decisions had discussed First Amendment rights in education
generally, but had not formally acknowledged the First Amendment free speech rights of
children. Such cases often dealt with coercive indoctrination, as in West Virginia v. Bamette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), where the Court invalidated a statute that required public school

students, including Jehovah's Witnesses opposed to the practice, to salute the flag. Tinker was
the first decision that did not just acknowledge children's intellectual rights, but actually
recognized children's rights as persons under the Constitution and the First Amendment. See
DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A PSYCHOLEGAL
ANALYSIS 12-14 (1989).
58. 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (upholding a statute that forbade
the sale of otherwise constitutionally protected sexually explicit magazines to minors).
59. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
60. Id. at 503.
61. Id. at 509.
62. Diamond, supra note 5, at 487.
63. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
64. See, e.g., Bartlett & Frost, supra note 3, at 318-19 (describing Tinker as a "cornerstone
of education law doctrine" that was eventually modified by subsequent Supreme Court

decisions).
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his analysis of Tinker, subsequent contradictory holdings in the lower courts
stemmed from "the Tinker Court's presentation of first amendment speech
rights as absolutely present or absent, in much the same way that it presented
children as fully adult persons." 5
Justice Black in his Tinker dissent warned that the Court should limit the
First Amendment rights of schoolchildren, because "school discipline, like
parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training our children
to be good citizens-to be better citizens."66 By contrast, Justice Fortas,
writing for the Tinker majority, recognized the need for school discipline and
order, but found that free speech in the school context would not be
inconsistent with that educational interest.67 Justice Fortas explained that
children are "possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect"
and that children should not be viewed as "closed-circuit recipients" of only
that which the State wishes to teach them. 8 However, he did not draw
explicit distinctions between children's rights and adult's rights, thereby
leaving the impression to some that children are vested with absolute
constitutional rights. As a result, courts and legislatures have continued to
cite the holding of Tinker in evaluating free speech scenarios in schools
without carefully distinguishing the free speech rights of children from those
of adults.
As one commentator has suggested, a right has meaning only "if we can
articulate its source and nature."69 Accordingly, any meaningful discussion
of children's rights must consider children's limited autonomy in the state and
in their families,"0 and must avoid characterizing the rights of children as
either non-existent or absolute.7 The Tinker Court found that "students in
school as well as out of school are persons under our Constitution."7 Yet
such a view of children's constitutional status may not consider that children
often lack the adult wisdom, experience, and insight to know what choices are
in their best interest.
65. Diamond, supra note 5, at 487.
66. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 508.
68. Id. at 511.
69. Irving R. Kaufman, Protecting the Rights of Minors: On Juvenile Autonomy and the
Limits of the Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 1019 (1977) (cited in Diamond, supra note 5, at
487). Professor Kaufman discusses the unique rights of minors in this criticism of the juvenile
justice system.
70. Kaufman, supra note 69, at 1019.
71. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 15, at 385, who argue that viewing children as
"presumptively autonomous persons" is contrary to Supreme Court policy:
For our children's own sake, we must often limit children's legally bestowed ("de
jure") autonomy in the short-run in order to maximize their actual ("de facto") autonomy
in the long-run. Such limits are essential not only to develop their own ability to function
independently, but also to sustain in perpetuity the social conditions that will continually
regenerate autonomous capacity within each new individual.
Id.
72. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol33/iss2/10

10

Clemes: Lovell v. Poway Unified School District: An Elementary Lesson Aga

1997]

LOVELL v POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

In cases that address children's rights in non-education contexts, the
Supreme Court has concluded that, as applied to a child, a right can have a
different meaning than as applied to an adult.73 For example, in Belloti v.
Baird, a state statute required parental notification for a minor to obtain an

abortion. The Court concluded the following:
We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions
m an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child-rearing. 74

Professor John Garvey, in a critical inquiry addressing the First
Amendment rights of children, concluded that children have rights to "certain
freedoms" against the government, despite the fact that they often lack the
maturity and wisdom to make competent choices.75 But such rights are
"parasitic upon" the rights of adults. Freedom of speech, Garvey argues, is
"derivative" in that children are learning to use a powerful tool that they will

have full use of when they are adults.76
Professor Garvey also notes that the Tinker Court endorsed a model of
education that rejects the traditional belief that disciplining is itself a primary
goal of education.'

Other commentators have echoed the view that normal

First Amendment analysis is inapplicable in the school context, because one
of the primary traditional functions of public education in America has been
value inculcation.78 While the First Amendment is an important American
value in such an inculcation model, it should not override other important
values .7

The leading Supreme Court cases that followed Tinker retreated from
Tinker's "substantially disruptive" constitutional standard and began to re-

73. For a discussion of such cases, see Diamond, supra note 5, at 492. Diamond discusses
limitations on children's constitutional rights in criminal proceedings and in obtaining abortions,
restrictions on broadcasts that contain indecent materials, and limitations on free expression of
religious ideas when child labor laws are implicated. Diamond's conclusion is that the case law
and critical commentaries "make the point that Tinker ignored: children are not fully persons for
constitutional purposes." Id. at 489.
74. 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion) (invalidating the statute, yet finding that
the state can compel a child to prove that she has sufficient maturity to make her own decisions)
(quoted in Diamond, supra note 5, at 493).
75. John H. Garvey, Children and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REy. 321, 327 (1979).
76. Id. at 344-45.
77. Id. at 340.
78. See, e.g., ROBERT WHEELER LANE, BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: FREE SPEECH
AND THE INCULCATION OF VALUES 48 (1995).

79. Professor Diamond argues that the Tinker Court erred in affording children the same
constitutional status as adults and in allowing the value of free speech to preempt other values.
He also concludes that the Court went wrong in assuming that the only way to teach First
Amendment values is to bring the unfettered free exchange of ideas allowable on the street into
the schoolhouse. Diamond, supra note 5, at 499-500.
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erect the gate that separated campus speech from street speech, thereby
limiting schoolchildren's free speech rights.
IH. BEYOND TNKER: REDEFINING SCHOOLCHILDREN'S RIGHTS

A. The Bethel and Hazelwood.Standards
In upholding the suspension of a student who gave an assembly speech
containing sexual innuendo,' the Court in Bethel School DistrictNo. 403
v. Fraser recognized the need to give appropriate deference to school
administrators. The audience in the Bethel assembly consisted mainly of 14year-olds who were required either to attend an assembly or go to a study
hall. In a speech nominating a fellow student for an elected student body
office, the student speaker referred to the candidate in terms of a "graphic
and explicit sexual metaphor."" Finding that the student had violated a
school rule prohibiting lewd speech, the principal suspended the student for
three days and removed his name from a list of potential graduation
speakers. 2
The Court found that certain speech-in this case indecent speech as
opposed to political speech in Tinker-may interfere with a school's "basic
educational mission."' Retreating from the Tinker standard, the Bethel
Court reasoned that the First Amendment rights of public school students
"are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings." ' The resulting Bethel standard is that it is a "highly appropriate
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse. "I As one commentator has suggested,
by adopting this more restrictive standard, the Supreme Court in Bethel had
"shattered the myth of the open schoolhouse gate," and provided a "polestar
86
for further restrictions on student speech.
In 1988, the Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,' appeared to reconcile the Tinker and Bethel standards by differentiating between various forms of speech and administrator involvement. The
Court held that the administrator in Hazelwood properly exercised his
discretion when he disallowed the publication of articles containing sexually
explicit material in the school newspaper. The Court distinguished such
"school-sponsored activity" from individual student speech that takes place
80. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

81. Id. at 677.
82. Id. at 678.
83. Id. at 685.
84. Id. at 682.
85. Id. at 683.

86. Scott D. Makar, Free Speech on High School and University Campuses, 14 CHILDREN'S

LEGAL RTS. J. 29 (1993).
87. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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on school grounds."8 While some have argued that Hazelwood is not a
major shift away from Tinker, 9 others have concluded that Hazelwood's
retreat from Tinker has resulted in an unclear standard.' ° The Hazelwood
standard is that public school authorities may censor school-sponsored
publications, as long as the censorship is "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."'" The consensus among commentators following
the Hazelwood decision suggests that the Supreme Court in 92Hazelwood
moved toward affording school administrators more discretion.
The defiant speech in Lovell is neither school-sponsored (Hazelwood),
indecent (Bethel), nor political (Tinker). Yet the underlying guidelines of
these cases, which recognize the need for limitations on speech when
legitimate pedagogical concerns exist, apply to defiant speech as well.
Moreover, defiant speech interferes with the basic educational mission of the
school at least as much as the indecent speech in Bethel. If the Court in
Tinker recognized the need for disciplinary limitations on free speech when
a schoolchild is engaging in political expression 93-an exercise reflecting the
core of the First Amendment right-then defiant speech such as Lovell's
warrants at least equal limitation.
In reconciling the cases on student speech, the Lovell court relied on a
1992 Ninth Circuit decision, Chandler v. McMinnville School District,94
which involved political expression as well. In Chandler,the court held that
students' First Amendment rights had been violated when they were
suspended for refusing to remove buttons that contained language in support
of striking teachers.95 Reviewing the prior Supreme Court decisions, the
court found three distinct categories of student speech: (1) vulgar and

88. Id. at 271. The Court reiterated the Tinker standard for individual political expression,
while finding that administrators are entitled to greater control over students' expression that
occurs in a school-sponsored context.
89. See, e.g., William Buss, School Newspapers, PublicForum, and the FirstAmendment,
74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 507 (1989).
90. See, e.g., Thomas C. Fischer, Whatever Happened to Mary Beth Tinker and Other
Sagas in the Marketplace of Ideas, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 351 (1983) (cited in Hafen
& Hafen, supra note 15, at 395 n.68). Professor Fischer concludes that Tinker's "sweeping grant
of Constitutional protection to students" is unworkable in the school setting. Id. at 357. As a
result, cases like Hazelwood have been able to weaken the Tinker standard. Id. at 358.
91. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. See Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School Dist.
and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, for a detailed description
of the inquiry required under the Hazelwood standard.
92. See, e.g., Makar, supra note 86, at 30 (describing the Hazelwood standard as "a
significant empowerment of school officials to prohibit student expression provided a single
'legitimate pedagogical concern' is articulated").
93.- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
94. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
95. Id. at 526.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1996

13

232

California Western Law Review, Vol. 33 [1996], No. 2, Art. 10
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
[Vol.

33

offensive speech, which must be judged by the Bethel guidelines; 96 (2)
school-sponsored speech, which must be judged by the Hazelwood standard; 97 and (3) all.other speech, which must be judged by Tinker's guidelines. 9 Because the buttons were not vulgar or indecent per se, and
because they were not endorsed by the school, 99 the court placed the
students' expression in the third category and found that they were not
substantially disruptive of school activities." °
Returning to the Tinker standard in the "catch-all" third category,
however, may overstate the case. Tinker was a political speech case, not a
"catch-all" case. The buttons in Chandlerare very similar to the armbands
approved of in Tinker. However, neither Tinker nor Chandler, nor their
facts, govern the defiant language in Lovell. If Lovell's speech is not a true
threat, her defiant speech should not fall into Chandler'sthird category by
default. Rather, applying Tinker's "substantially disruptive" standard, and
especially the spirit of Bethel and Hazelwood, the student in Lovell should
constitutionally be subject to sanction for "legitimate pedagogical" reasons.
-While broadly stating the Tinker standard, the Chandler court nonetheless acknowledged that school children do not have the same rights as adults.
It also recognized the door to judicial intervention in local administrator
decisions which cases like Tinker had opened:
The First Amendment rights of public school students "are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."
Despite the fact that the suppression of speech has obvious First
Amendment implications, courts are not necessarily in the best position to
decide whether speech restrictions are appropriate. "The determination of
what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board," and not with the federal
courts. 01

96. As discussed supra at notes 85 and 86 and accompanying text, the Bethel standard is
that it is a "highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse," since it interferes with a school's "basic educational
mission." Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
97. The Hazelwood standard is that public school authorities may censor school-sponsored
publications, as long as the censorship is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
98. Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529. The Tinker rule provided that students could engage in
political expression as long as they did not "materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" nor "impinge upon the
rights" of other students. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969).
99. Chandler, 978 F.2d at 530.
100. Id. at 530-3 1.
101. Id. at 527 (citing Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682-83).
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B. Aligning Lovell with Supreme Court Cases
Instead of returning to the Tinker standard, which characterized the free
speech rights of schoolchildren on campus as being equal to those off
campus, a more sophisticated analysis should focus on the limitations on
student speech that have emerged since Tinker. Recognizing that schoolchildren's "derivative"" free speech rights should not overshadow legitimate
pedagogical concerns, the Supreme Court no longer requires that speech may
be limited only if it is "substantially disruptive." Instead, school administrators are justified in limiting schoolchildren's speech if it simply "interferes
with the basic educational mission" of the school, according to the 1986
Bethel decision.
Unfortunately, the Lovell court seemed so unsure of the meaning of
Section 48950, it may have refrained from considering the school's
educational mission at all.1t 0 Had the court considered the issue of whether
schools can limit student's civil discourse, it could have found that such oncampus statements interfere with the basic educational mission of the school.
The basic mission of schools includes both the teaching of discipline and the
teaching of mutual respect among teachers and students. Moreover, given
the very real fear of student outbursts and even violence in the schools,
deterring potentially threatening speech among students is a legitimate
pedagogical concern in the 1990s.
Applying the Bethel and Hazelwood standards also reflects a practical
understanding of the dynamics of value inculcation in the schools. Tinker's
high "substantial disruption" standard does not account for everyday
occurrences in school that could arguably be protected under Tinker. For
example, children have the right to use bad grammar on the street, yet their
teachers can mark them down or even fail them when they use the same
language in an English paper. Likewise, a child need not raise her hand to
speak in the park, yet most class rules require hand raising to speak in class.
To fulfill its unique educational mission and to maintain order, schools need
to limit the individual speech of children in many instances.
Considering this unique role of schools, the Lovell court could well have
found that the school administrators were constitutionally justified in
punishing Lovell for her statement, even though this same statement may
well be protected if spoken on the street. Had the court not avoided this
issue by characterizing her statement as an unprotected "true threat," the
court would then have faced the more difficult hurdle of reconciling Bethel
with Section 48950.

102. See Garvey's discussion, supra note 75. Children's free speech rights, while not
absent, are also not absolute. They are "derivative" of the free speech rights of adults.
103. Neither the earlier withdrawn decision, Lovell, WL 140805, at *3 (9th Cir. March 29,
1996) (withdrawn), nor the revised decision, 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. July 18, 1996),
analyzed the Lovell facts in terms of the law of Tinker, Bethel, or Hazelwood, even though both
outlined the broad principles of these cases.
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IV. THE PANDORA'S Box IN CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE
SECTION 48950
A. The Controversy Over Section 48950
In Lovell, the Ninth Circuit was interpreting student rights not only
under the First Amendment, but also under Section 48950, passed in 1992.
The statute gives both university and public high school students the same
speech rights on campus as they have off campus:
School districts operating one or more high schools and private
secondary schools shall not make or enforce any rule subjecting any high
school pupil to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is
speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside of the
campus, is protected from governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United States
0 4 Constitution or Section 2 of Article I of the
California Constitution. 1
The California Legislature must not have meant, however, that the
school context is the same as a playground or a park setting. By explicitly
referencing Tinker in the committee reports," the Legislature recognized,
at the very least, that the special rule of "substantial disruption" governed
school speech. Still, those same reports failed to incorporate the more
deferential Bethel and Hazelwood rules,"es which recognized a stronger line
of division than Tinker had between the school context and the public forum.
Even though the Legislature did not incorporate the Bethel rule, it referenced
the Tinker rule, which seems to indicate that the Legislature at least
recognized that substantially disruptive speech is not protected. Yet the
Senate Bill underlying Section 48950 explicitly states "that a student shall
have the same right to exercise his or her right to free speech on campus as
he or she enjoys when off campus" 10--a standard incongruent even with
Tinker.
104. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(a) (West 1992). See also California Statutes and
Amendments to the Codes of 1992, Ch. 1363 [SB 1115, Leonard] (1992) for the full text and
Legislative Council's Digest of the bill underlying the statute.
105. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, REPORT FOR 1991 CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL

No. 1115, 1991-92 REG. SESSION (1992). The Legislature cited Tinker in its comments to the
bill underlying Section 48950, yet failed to acknowledge the trend in the Supreme Court since
Tinker to limit high school students' First Amendment rights to protect the basic educational
mission of schools. Id.
106. The statute purports to rely on Tinker, while implicitly rejecting the Bethel and
Hazelwood standards. Id. While other states have considered such legislation, the majority of
states have rejected it. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 15, at 406.
107. See California Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of 1992, Ch. 1363 [SB 1115,
Leonard] (1992). Senate Bill 1115 led to the enactment of CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950 and
various other amendments to then-existing Education statutes, including CAL. EDUC. CODE §
94367 (West 1992), which also included the statement, "It is the intent of the Legislature that
a student shall have the same right to exercise his or her right to free speech on campus as he
or she enjoys when off campus." Id.
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This Part will outline the effect of Section 48950, specifically arguing
that the California Legislature should not have included high school students
in a statute that gives university students the same speech rights on campus
as on the street. In the alternative, the statute should be construed to
recognize the legitimate mission of schools. No education is possible if
defiant speech that interferes with the school's educational mission must be
tolerated. Since Bethel and Hazelwood, and even Tinker, do not require this
outcome, neither should the California statute.
B. University Speech Codes and High School Willful Defiance?
California State Senator Leonard introduced Senate Bill 1115 ,l 1s the
precursor to Section 48950, to combat the proliferation of speech codes on
various university campuses."' These speech codes subjected students to
discipline if they engaged in certain kinds of "hate speech" or other speech
designed to intimidate members of perceived minority groups. ° Concerned that such speech codes reflected "politically correct" efforts to
infringe on the speech of conservative students, Leonard argued that
educational institutions should be "bastions of unfettered free expression.""' Specifically, the statute gives students whose schools discipline
them in violation of this statute standing to seek relief in civil court. It also
awards prevailing plaintiffs attorney's fees."'
The "Leonard Bill" erred in two ways. First, Leonard most likely had
viewpoint discrimination of the Tinker variety in mind when he wrote the
bill. Yet the Bill failed to enunciate this viewpoint discrimination standard,
applying instead a "street" standard inappropriate to the educational setting.
Second, the statute failed to distinguish between university students and

108. This Senate Bill (SB 1115) was also known as the "Leonard Bill," named after its

author, California State Senator Bill Leonard.
109. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA

LEGISLATURE STATE ASSEMBLY FINAL

ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 1115 (1992). In the floor debates, Leonard expressed concerns about

university speech codes that "encourage students to conform to a 'politically correct' view."

He cited the example of a UCLA student editor who was suspended for running a cartoon in a
school paper that was critical of affirmative action. Quoted in Ken Hoover, Bill Banning Speech

Codes Passes Senate, U.P.I. NEWS SERVICE, June 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library,

UPI File. Leonard also told a news service that he was "prompted to introduce the legislation

in part by a story about a high school principal in Kansas who sent a youngster home for
wearing a Bart Simpson T-Shirt that said, 'School Sucks.'" Quoted in Betty Dietz, Committee
Boosts Free Speech, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, August 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, News
Library, GNS File.
110.

ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE STATE ASSEMBLY FINAL

ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 1115 (1992). Senator Leonard apparently was concerned that such
codes "add to an atmosphere of intolerance on campus," unfairly punishing students who may
hold beliefs contrary to majority views. Id.
111. Id.
112. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(b) (West 1992) provides that any pupil enrolled in a
school that "has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdivision (a) may commence a civil
action to obtain appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief as determined by the court." The
subsection then provides attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. Id.
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secondary school students."' Admittedly, both the public school and the
university settings encourage the exchange of ideas in a "marketplace of
ideas.""' 4 Unlike university administrators who are mainly concerned that
the speech of one adult student. offends or intimidates another adult
student," 5 however, public school administrators must maintain order over
minor students to whom they have a state-mandated obligation to provide an
education." 6 High school students, who are younger and less mature than

their university counterparts, require more guidance and discipline." 7
University students, on the other hand, have chosen to pursue post-secondary

education. Such adult students can expect to receive the same free speech

protections as other adults in society, although order is also necessary in a
college classroom to avoid cacophony and confusion. The Leonard Bill and
its proponents failed to recognize both the disparities between minor and
adult students and the problems of disruption in both contexts.
C. Statutory Expansion of Student Rights in California
In Bethel, the Supreme Court had upheld an educational limit on speech
that would have been protected on the street."' By contrast, the Ninth
Circuit's original Lovell decision concluded that Section 48950 expanded the

113. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON EDUCATION, REPORT FOR 1991 CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL
No. 1115, 1991-92 REG. SESSION (1992).
114. See Bartlett & Frost, supra note 3, at 311.
115. This Note refers to university speech code cases only to explain the origins of Section
48950. Since the focus of this Note is defiant speech in public secondary schools, it will
consider these university cases only to the extent that their inapplicability in a public school
environment becomes apparent.
116. While the Supreme Court has not formally recognized the right to an education, the
Supreme Court of California has held, "We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless
function of education in our society warrants, indeed, compels our treatment of it as a
fundamental interest." Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 608 (1971) (cited in Hafen & Hafen,
supra note 15).
117. The Assembly Committee on Education noted the differences between college and high
school students when it raised the following concern in its Committee Hearing on the Leonard
Bill:
Should high schools be bound by the same free speech requirements as colleges?
The author's primary intent is aimed at preventing speech codes on university campuses.
Yet, this bill extends the same speech protections to high school students. High schools
may be qualitatively different than universities in that (a) they have a constitutional
obligation to provide students with an education, and (b) high school students are less
mature than college students and, therefore, may need more guidance. Should this bill
delete the reference to high school students?
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, REPORT FOR 1991 CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL No.
1115, 1991-92 REG. SESSION (1992). But see Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th
Cir. 1991) (cited in Makar, supra note 86, at 32). The Eleventh Circuit extended Hazelwood
from the public school to the university in a case where a professor was propounding his
religious beliefs in the university classroom.
118, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
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First Amendment rights of California students." 9 The language of the
Leonard Bill unambiguously rejects the notion that students' free speech
rights are subject to greater regulation in public schools: "It is the intent of
the Legislature that a student shall have the same right to exercise his or her°
right to free speech on campus as he or she enjoys when off campus."'
However, even Tinker recognized the need to avoid "substantial disruption"
in the school, thereby distinguishing the school context from the street
context. Yet the California Legislature, while referencing Tinker, ignored
such a distinction and incorporated a street standard into this statute.
Prior to the enactment of Section 48950 in 1992,11 California school
boards looked to California Education Code Section 48900 for guidance on
local disciplinary discretion." California Education Code Section 48900
stated the grounds for which a high school student would formerly be
suspended, including the disruption of school activities and the "willful
defiance" of school officials in the exercise of their duties." Thus, local
school administrators facing a Lovell situation before 1992 may well have
had the discretion to suspend the student for speech that was willfully defiant
of the counselor, even if it was not threatening to her.'2
Since the passage of Section 48950, public school administrators must
think twice before disciplining a student who openly defies a teacher.
Because children need not obey their teachers on the street, need they obey
them in the classroom? This uncertainty creates a situation of doubt among
administrators and teachers at a time when the educational problems in the
schools are particularly pressing. The Ninth Circuit avoided reconciling the
Supreme Court cases, in the context of a statutory mandate to treat schools
like streets in some unspecified respect. The Ninth Circuit thereby passed
up the chance to clarify the purview of Section 48950, perhaps even limiting

119.
120.
Leonard]
121.

Lovell, 1996 WL 14805, at *4 (9th Cir. March 29, 1996) (withdrawn).
California Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of 1992, Ch. 1363 [SB 1115,
(1992).
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950 (West 1992).

122. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE STATE ASSEMBLY FINAL
ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 1115 (1992).

123. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900. This Section further provides that no such discipline
shall occur unless the student's conduct is "related to school activity or school attendance" and
such conduct "occurred within a school."
124. The Assembly Committee considering Senate Bill 1115 described the discretion
afforded school boards prior to consideration of this Bill. Specifically, the then-existing law
"expresse[d] legislative intent that school boards not be prevented from adopting ... policies
relating to oral expression by students." Such law protected the free speech of students, "except
when such expression is obscene, libelous, slanderous, or substantially disrupts the orderly
operation of the school." ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, REPORT FOR 1991
CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL No. 1115, 1991-92 REG. SESSION (1992). The Legislative Counsel's

Digest of Senate Bill 1115 provides: "Under existing [prior to Section 48950] law, public
secondary schools . . . are considered limited public forums and, thus, certain conduct by
students, including speech . . . may be regulated to a greater extent than speech or other
communication in other public forums." California Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of
1992, Ch. 1363 [SB 1115, Leonard] (1992).
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its embrace to the viewpoint discrimination Senator Leonard had in mind.
The Lovell court may well have deferred to the California state courts to
interpret the legislation on first impression.
Recognizing that true threats are never protected speech, Section 48950
does not "prohibi[t] the imposition of discipline for harassment, threats, or
intimidation, unless constitutionally protected."" z Yet the explanations of
these terms in the Bill and Senator Leonard's statements in the floor debates
make it clear that such discipline is restricted only to speech that would be
considered truly threatening even in a non-school environment.2 6 To avoid
resolving this dilemma, the Ninth Circuit thus concluded that Lovell's speech
was not only defiant and uncivil but also a threat.
D. Section 48950's UncertainAftennath
The fallout in California colleges, schools, and courts since the passage
of Section 48950 has been two-fold. First, the Leonard Bill has aided in the
successful challenge of speech codes on university campuses. Even while the
California Legislature was still debating the Leonard Bill, the University of
California and Stanford University amended their codes to punish only
fighting words that might incite violence." z Since the passage of Section
48950, several university students in California have relied on the statute to
sue their colleges for unlawful disciplinary actions.'2
By contrast, the Section 48950 directive to public school administrators
has created confusion in the high schools and the courts. Initial opponents

125. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(d) (West 1992).
126. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(d) provides that harassment, threats, or intimidation are

not protected, "unless constitutionally protected."

No explanation is provided on how

intimidation, for example, could be constitutionally protected. Senator Leonard's intent to allow

discipline only when a student's statement reaches the level of a criminal threat is evidenced by

his statement in the Senate floor debate. "[This bill] does not increase anyone's right of free

speech; it gives no one a right to misbehave in a criminal nature on or off the public school or
private school campus." Quoted in Jim Specht, California Senate OK's Bill to Protect Free
Speech on Campus, GANNETTNEWS SERVICE, June 5, 1991, availablein LEXIS, News Library,
GNS File.
127. Ken Hoover, Bill Banning Speech Codes Passes Senate, U.P.I. NEWS SERVICE, June
4, 1991, availablein LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
128. For example, members of a fraternity at Occidental College escaped disciplinary action

after they circulated a private newsletter that described a rape in verse. Their attorney, relying

on Section 48950 and other law, filed suit against the college, which then agreed to stay its
disciplinary proceedings and to revise its harassment policy. Linda Seebach, Political
Correctness in LA, NATIONAL REVIEW, July 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,

NTNREV File. The same attorney represented members of a fraternity at California State
University at Northridge who were threatened with suspension after posting a flier that alluded

to a lewd drinking song that disparaged Mexican women. The attorney has acknowledged that
such suits are easier in California because of Section 48950. After reading the law, he "realized
that this was a tremendous tool in reversing this trend [of speech codes]. It gives us a powerful
tool in beating back encroachments on the First Amendment by college radicals." Valerie

Richardson, Free Speech "Vigilante" Nemesis of Campus Political Correctness, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, March 29, 1993, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, WTIMES
File.
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of the statute, including the California School Boards Association, had feared
that Section 48950 would restrict school administrators' abilities to limit
student behavior, given the broad and ambiguous language of the statute.129
The ambiguity of the statute became apparent just a year after Section
48950 became law, after the Legislature passed Assembly Bill (AB) 980 in
1993.130 AB 980 permitted school district governing boards to adopt
reasonable policy regulations regarding the wearing of "gang-related apparel"
13
by public school students, including school uniforms implementation. 1
Still fearing the litigation risks of Section 48950, some school districts
seeking to implement a uniform dress code in 1994 sought a statement from
the Legislature to clarify the relation of Section 48950 to AB 980.132 As
a result, the Legislature modified AB 980 in 1994 to provide that a
schoolwide uniform policy did not violate the free speech restrictions in
Section 48950.133 This request points both to the ambiguously wide reach of
Section 48950 and to the frustration of school administrators whose discretion
is no longer clear in the wake of Section 48950.
E. Lessons from Lovell: Close the Section 48950 Pandora'sBox
Courts in California that have addressed Section 48950 claims have also
had difficulty defining the purview of this statute."3 The contradictions in
129. In the Committee Hearings in the Assembly, many concerns about the statute's intent
arose. For example, would the statute "supersede existing law which requires schools to adopt
rules and regulations elaborating the guidelines for written publications by students?" Would
this statute "nullify existing intent language that school boards not be prevented from adopting
similar guidelines for oral expression by students," pursuant to Section 48907 of the Education
Code? Would the statute "impede a school's ability to maintain order on campus?" "Should
high schools be bound by the same free speech requirements as colleges?" ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, REPORT FOR 1991 CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL No. 1115, 1991-92
REG. SESSION (1992).
130. Assembly Bill 980 became CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (1993). See California Statutes
and Amendments to the Codes of 1993, Ch. 435 [AB 980, Allen] (1993).
131. Id. The bill permitted, but did not mandate, the adoption of schoolwide uniform
policies. The bill's author, Assemblywoman Doris Allen, argued that this bill was necessary
to counteract Section 48950, since it had been interpreted by some school officials as inhibiting
the enforcement of anti-gang dress codes. The California School Board Association and other
school and parent organizations supported the bill, while the American Civil Liberties Union
opposed it. Eric Bailey, Wilson Signs Orange County Legislator's Gang-Attire Bill, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
132.

SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, REPORT FOR 1993 CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL No.

1269, 1993-94 REG. SESSION (1994).
133. Id.
134. For example, in Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 34 Cal.
App. 4th. 1302, 1330, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 779 (1995), a California Appellate Court had to
decide on first impression whether Section 48950 trumped Education Code Section 48907, which
provides for a system of prior restraint of school-sponsored materials that are obscene, libelous,
or slanderous. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907. The court in Lopez held that Section 48950 did not
govern this case, where an administrator had asked a high school student to edit a class
videotape that contained lewd material. The Ninth Circuit later, in its first Lovell decision,
Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 140805, at *4 (March
29, 1996) (withdrawn), noted that Section 48907 expanded the free speech rights of students who
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the two Ninth Circuit Lovell rulings point to the Pandora's box which the
California Legislature created by enacting this wide-reaching statute. As
discussed in Part I above, the two Ninth Circuit Lovell decisions interpret
Section 48950 very differently. In the withdrawn decision, the Ninth Circuit,
applying Section 48950, reasoned:
To be sure, the legislature seemed concerned primarily with
expression of alternate, and often unpopular or minority viewpoints.
Although the legislature focused on expression such as Tinker's armbands,
it did not, however, exclude protection for statements like Lovell's. It
quite clearly expressed the intent to expand students' rights to the
boundaries of speech protected by the First Amendment. And outside of the
school context the First Amendment protects speech that is merely rude and

petulant from content-based regulations. The California legislature quite
likely did not consider conduct such as Lovell's when it enacted 48950.
But the clear language of the statute invites challenges like this one-it
invites students to make federal cases out of school disciplinaryactions.3

The Ninth Circuit reversed its own decision but avoided the statutory
interpretation issue by deciding that Lovell's statement was a true threat after
all, which would not be constitutionally protected by the federal or state
standard. 36 However, the court's true motives emerged in the reversing
opinion, when the court examined the high school environment more
carefully and noted in the opinion repeatedly the increasing violence that
exists in schools today. 137 This factual reconstruction may have solved the
Section 48950 problem for the day, but it left the statute as an unchecked
fetter on school administrators and teachers.
In sum, the California Legislature should reconsider Section 48950. A
statute that was enacted to curtail speech codes on university campuses has
also tied the hands of public high school administrators to maintain order in
high schools. In addition, a statute that perhaps contemplated only political
expression or viewpoint discrimination cases has offered the carrot of
attorney's fees to high school student plaintiffs who have potentially
threatened or willfully defied their teachers.'
The California Legislature
should close the Section 48950 Pandora's Box by removing high school
students from its purview, or, at a minimum, by permitting educators to
publish materials in school-sponsored newspapers, which also runs counter to the Supreme Court
trend of limiting the free speech rights of students. (See discussion of Hazelwood in Part M
supra.)
135. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 14085, at *5
(9th Cir. March 29, 1996) (withdrawn) (emphasis added).
136. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th
Cir. July 18, 1996).
137. See discussion of the repeated references to violence in the second Ninth Circuit
opinion in Part I supra.
138. Plaintiffs like Lovell find access to the federal courts by invoking their First
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Yet by bringing her claim in federal
court, Lovell did not have to meet the state court requirement to exhaust her administrative
remedies, including appealing the decision within the school district. See supra note 27.
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forbid speech that is not appropriate to the decorum of the educational
setting. 13 9

V. ARGUMENTS INFAVOR OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR DISCRETION
A. A Modem Argument: The Trend of Violence
Along with applying Bethel's "interference with education" standard, the
Lovell court should have given the local administrators more deference in
determining what behavior interferes with education. School administrators
are better equipped than judges to develop policies that best meet their local
educational goals. Similarly, administrators can best determine the impact
of defiant speech on the school environment, particularly in light of one
compelling trend that teachers must face with increasing regularity: the
sharp rise of violence in the schools. This Part will argue for granting such
administrators substantial constitutional leeway in carrying out their everincreasing task of maintaining order in the schools.
In its reversing Lovell decision, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly bemoaned
the rise in violence that teachers must face in the public schools." By
noting this rise in violence, the court implicitly recognized that administrators
are in a better position to determine whether a statement like Lovell's
conveys a gravity of harm to its recipient. 4 ' The Supreme Court recently
recognized that "this widespread violence in schools throughout the Nation
significantly interferes with the quality of education in those schools.",'
One of the most obvious consequences of school violence is the creation
of fear in the students, which in turn hampers the learning process and the
educational mission of the school.4 3 But of equal concern is the effect of
such violence on teachers and administrators who must work daily in
increasingly volatile work erivironments. The National Center for Education
reported the following statistics of teachers it surveyed in 1993: nineteen
percent had been "verbally abused" by students in the last four weeks prior
to the survey, eight percent had been "threatened with injury" in the last
139. Whether or not the restrictions on college speech codes are still merited in California
deserves consideration in a separate scholarly inquiry.

140. See supra note 50 for quotations from the Ninth Circuit opinion. As discussed there,

the Ninth Circuit had not even mentioned this rise in violence in its earlier withdrawn opinion.
141. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 373 (9th

Cir. July 18, 1996).
dissenting) (citing
142. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1659 (1995) (Breyer, J.,

sources to support the proposition that "the problem of guns in and around schools is widespread
carry a gun
and extremely serious" and that "four percent of American high school students ...
to school at least occasionally") (quoted in Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372). Indeed, a variety of sources
document the presence of violence in our public schools today. See, e.g., Florence M. Stone

& Kathleen B. Boundy, School Violence: The Need for a Meaningful Response, 28 CLEARiNG-

HOUSE REv. 453 (1994); Smith & Elstein, supranote 16, at 22.
143. "Schools, once considered havens of stability and safety, have become settings where
students are at risk of being exposed to violence." Stone & Boundy, supranote 142, at 453.
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twelve months, and two percent had been "physically attacked" in the last
twelve months.144 Teachers and administrators on the frontline of public
schools in 1997 must deal regularly with anything from pupils' willful
defiance to kids with weapons. They are in the best position to evaluate the
impact a student's defiant statement has on the learning environment.
Thus, violence in the schools provides an additional reason for why
discretion should rest with teachers and administrators in handling student
infractions. While administrators facing Lovell-type statements must remain
within constitutional bounds in their disciplining, state statutes should not
further limit educators' discretion.
B. A TraditionalArgument for Local Control
This rise in violence in the schools, which clearly was a factor in the
Lovell reversal, is a uniquely modem fact. 145 It justifies giving school
administrators maximum constitutional discretion in assessing the impact of
a student's statement, not in restricting that discretion. An additional
justification for discretion stems from the long tradition in the United States
of leaving school board decisions in the hands of local administrators and the
school board appeals process."
As recently as 1995, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the role of local
school boards in disciplining public school students. In Vernonia School
District47J v. Acton, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a school district's drug policy for student athletes.' 47 In Vernonia, Justice
Scalia compares public school teachers' power over their students to that of
private teachers: "When parents place minor children in private schools
•. .the teachers and administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis
over the children entrusted to them."" Justice Scalia then explains that
144. EDUCATION WEEK, Apr. 7, 1993, at 7. See also PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY, NATIONAL
SCHOOL SAFETY CENTER, SCHOOL CRIME AND VIOLENCE STATISTICAL REVIEW 5-6 (Aug. 1993)
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (1991) (reporting that 16 percent of teachers it surveyed had been
attacked or threatened with attack in the six months prior to the survey) and ILLINOIS CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, TRENDS AND ISSUES 91 (1991) (reporting that one in eleven
of the 1300 teachers in Illinois public high schools it surveyed had been threatened by a student
during the prior month; that 52.9 percent had a student direct an obscenity at them; and that
32.4 percent had a student make an obscene gesture at them)).

145. See supra note 50.
146. See Wren, supra note 16, at 314.

147. 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995) (holding that the school's athlete urine testing policy did not

violate a student's federal or state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches).
148. Id. at 2391. Justice Scalia defines in locoparentisby quoting from 1 W. Blackstone,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441 (1769), which finds the following:
A parent may ... delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such
portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and

correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol33/iss2/10

24

Clemes: Lovell v. Poway Unified School District: An Elementary Lesson Aga

1997]

LOVELL v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRIcT

the Supreme Court has "rejected the notion that public schools, like private
schools, exercise only parental power over their students." Such parental
power, Justice Scalia points out, is "not subject to constitutional constraints." 4 9 Instead, the school's power is "custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free

adults."

50

Still, Justice Scalia acknowledges that "for many purposes,

school authorities act in locoparentis,with the power to inculcate habits and

manners of civility."''

Under this view, schools have a legal obligation

to protect students while they attend public schools.m

Coupled with this

power and responsibility, Justice Scalia concludes that schools should be
given substantial "constitutional leeway" in carrying out their "traditional
mission of responding to particularized wrongdoing."' 53 Thus, the traditional Supreme Court view of the power of local administrators enhances the
argument in favor of local discretion.
C. JudicialDeference to School Administrators

Although the courts have been reluctant to intervene in the schools,
increasing litigation in the area of schoolchildren's free speech rights has
forced the courts to re-assess their roles in such interventions. 4 In Lovell,
the California statute so constrained the Ninth Circuit that it could find no
way to defer appropriate discretionary authority to the school board other
than by fudging its factual conclusion. Except for Judge Noonan's initial
dissent, the Ninth Circuit in its first opinion failed to consider how much
deference to afford the school in assessing the context and impact of the
student's statement. Specifically, the court gave the school principal little
deference in determining, contextually, whether Lovell's statement was
threatening. 5 By contrast, in the reversing opinion, the court accepted the
Id.
149. Id. By comparison, under the traditional doctrine of parenspatriae,the state's interest
in a child's education was so strong that it could outweigh substantial parental objections about
the child's schooling. A number of cases have moved back toward parens patriae in recent
years to avoid the notion that schools have to follow the parents' wishes. Wren, supra note 13,
at 314.
150. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
151. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)).
152. See Wren, supra note 16, at 314 (citing Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting
Our Children and the FourthAmendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 817, 823-24 (1992) ("asserting
that the state's obligation to protect students from harm at school stems from state tort law and
state and local regulatory law")). Moreover, Wren explains that school administrators even have
an "affirmative duty" to enforce order and discipline in the schools. Wren, supra note 16, at
315 (citing Logar v. New York, 543 N.Y.S.2d 611, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)).
153. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
154. See Julie Goyer, Student FirstAmendment Rights in the Public School Setting:A Topic
of IncreasedLitigation, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 163, 166 (1982) (discussing the controversy
surrounding the courts' increasing intervention in school matters).
155. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 140805, at *45 (9th Cir. March 29, 1996) (withdrawn) (rejecting the school board's argument for deference).
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principal's characterization of the facts.15 6 Had the Lovell court determined
that the statement was not a threat, and was therefore constitutionally
protected, it would then have had to decide which substantive standard to
apply to the statement.
If, for example, the court had decided to use the Bethel standard, much
analysis remained in determining whether the student's outburst interfered
with the school's educational mission. In such an analysis, deference to the
school administrator's expertise is especially appropriate. Since the judge
may not understand as well as the local administrator how much a distraction
interferes with learning," s it makes sense for courts to defer to the judgments of school administrators, who are in a better position to assess the
impact of a student's statement on the school environment." 8
In Tinker, Justice Harlan in dissent, concluded that the "widest
authority" must be given to the school board.' 59 Justice Harlan even
proposed a deferential minimum standard of review where the student had the
"burden of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other
than legitimate school concerns."16 On the other hand, those who oppose
a minimum rationality standard argue that it places too great a burden on the
student plaintiff to overcome a presumption of constitutionality.' 6'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Bethel concluded explicitly that the
manner of speech appropriate in a school is a decision that local administrators are ina better position than judges to make. 62 Judge Noonan in the
original Lovell dissent echoed such a reluctance for courts to intervene and
implicitly embraced a deferential position:
It is no doubt remarkable that such an error in administrative
judgment may be redressed by the federal courts. But I cannot avoid the
feeling that this federal act of vindication robs the school of its rightful
responsibilities, trivializes the First Amendment, and contributes to the
overload of the federal courts by rewarding attorneys such as Lovell's with
a fee of over $11,000 .... The First Amendment does not answer these
questions. I'd say that the school is the right place to decide all the facts
if the procedure the school offers is as fair as the one provided here; and

156. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist, 90 F.3d 367, 373 (9th

Cir. July 18, 1996).

157. Diamond, supra note 5, at 481-82.

158. See Dessem, Board of Curatorsof the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz: Academic vs.

JudicialExpertise, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 476 (1978) (cited in Diamond, supra note 5, at 498).
159. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. Id.

161. See, e.g., Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake

of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REv. 253, 318 (1992) (arguing the danger of a standard where
students are able to prevail only if the school clearly abuses its discretion).
162. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
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the school is to decide the penalty if it is as far from immoderate as the
one imposed here ....61
A number of other courts have agreed with this deference to local

discretion, including the Ninth Circuit Chandler v. McMinnville School
District case discussed above in Part II."

A district court in Massachu-

setts recently recognized that substituting its own judgment for thfat of school
officials "raises the nightmarish potential of this court mired in the role of
Dress Code Board of Appeals."" 6 The court in Pyle v. South Hadley
School Committee reasoned: "Again, it is important to emphasize that the
First Amendment does not require the court to substitute its own judgment
to determine based on the
on these issues for that of the defendants, but only
' 66
reasonable."'
are
concerns
these
whether
record
Just as the Ninth Circuit deferred to the school administrator in Lovell
for its factual determination, a state court of appeals in Alabama in 1989
concluded that it should defer to school administrators on factual matters:
We would further note that school disciplinary matters are best
resolved by the local community school boards and officials and that courts
should supersede only when the school board's actions are clearly
unconstitutional. This court will not review or revise school board
disciplinary actions except in the rare cases where there is a shocking
disparity between the offense and the penalty. We will not question the
wisdom of those entrusted with the duties of enforcement, as these matters
are the prerogative of the school administrators rather than the courts. 67

In addition to reversing clearly unconstitutional viewpoint-based school
board actions, the court should make sure that the school did not violate the
student's procedural due process rights when it determines the facts. For the
most part, schools are employing better procedural safeguards to avoid
abuses of discretion. 61 Still, such procedures must necessarily be flexible.
The Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez allowed school administrators to make
163. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 140805, at *11
(9th Cir. March 29, 1996) (withdrawn).
164. Despite the fact that suppression of speech has obvious First Amendment implications,
courts are not necessarily in the best position to decide whether speech restrictions are
appropriate. "The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate rests with the school board, and not with the federal courts." 978
F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685).
165. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7, 10 at n.2 (D.C. Mass. 1993).
166. Id. at 10. See also Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 522 (C.D.
Cal. 1969) (holding that students suspended for using profanity in an off-campus newspaper
received procedural due process). ("It is not for the court to consider whether such rules are
wise or expedient, but merely whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion
of the school authorities." Id.)
167. Scoggins v. Henry County Bd. of Educ., 549 So. 2d 99, 101 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)
(holding that expulsion of student who had threatened teacher was proper) (citing Davis v. Ann
Arbor Public Schs., 313 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. Mich. 1970)) (emphasis added).
168. See Mawdsley, supra note 5, at 881.
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disciplinary judgments involving short suspensions without conducting a full
trial. 169 The Goss Court described the importance of flexible, informal
disciplining procedures in the schools:
Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the educational
function is to be performed. Events calling for discipline are frequent
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action. Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order, but a
valuable educational device.'7

The principle behind due process requirements of fact finding is to afford
local administrators the authority and flexibility to engage in limited fact
finding and to make a decision based on all the evidence available to them.
D. Lessons Learned: Intervention in Limited Circumstances
These decisions show that the courts are aware of their limited roles in
adjudicating school board disciplinary decisions. Even where the student
plaintiff has raised free speech violation issues, the primary factual
determination should be made at the school level. The Ninth Circuit, in the
end, properly deferred to educators to determine the facts when enforcing
school rules. Students can appeal a principal's decision through the school
board administrative appeals process,' 7 ' but only in rare cases should the
court revisit factual determinations properly arrived at in accordance with
school disciplinary procedures.
If public school students judicially challenge the disciplinary discretion
of school administrators, the role of the trial court should not be to substitute
its own factual evaluation for that of the administrators'--administrators
familiar with the context of modem schools and a violent environment quite
unlike that experienced by judges years before. The trial court should ensure
that administrators met the Goss due process requirements"7 and had

169. 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (finding that students with short suspensions do not have
the right to secure counsel, call witnesses, cross-examine the school's witnesses, etc., since
"further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature
may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroys its effectiveness
as part of the teaching process").
170. Id. at 580. The Court did require that the student be given oral or written notice of
the charges and, if he denies them, "an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story." Id. at 581. In response to Goss, California
enacted Education Code Sections 48900 and 48911 to establish procedures for issuing a
suspension. In the Lovell case, the trial court found that the administrator complied with these
requirements when she met with the student and the counselor. Lovell By and Through Lovell
v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
171. See supra note 27 for an overview of the Poway Unified School District's appeals
process.
172. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.C. Mass. 1993).
173. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-83.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol33/iss2/10

28

Clemes: Lovell v. Poway Unified School District: An Elementary Lesson Aga

19971

LOVELL v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRCT

for their decision. 4 Such a model affords
reasonable evidentiary support
"constitutional leeway" 17 5 to school administrators, but still protects
students from school administrators who overstep their disciplinary discretion
where there is no evidence of wrongdoing, or where the administrators are
clearly, as in the case of Tinker, engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination.
Administrators who face statements like "If you don't give me this schedule
change, I'm going to shoot you" from students, should have the discretion
to impose quick judgments without fearing that the courts will second-guess
such decisions.
CONCLUSION

In its second Lovell decision, the Ninth Circuit avoided the difficult task
of assessing Lovell's constitutional rights in lieu of both Supreme Court
policy and Section 48950 by finding that Lovell's statement was a true threat
after all. Had the court found that the statement was not a true threat, it
would have had to strike a delicate balance between an individual student's
rights and the educational goals of the school. Unfortunately, that balance
was upset by legislation that seems to ignore the special context of the high
school setting, leaving courts and administrators with an "all or nothing"
decision. This legislation should be clarified or repealed because schools are
special settings that require particularized analysis of conflicting interests,
including the interest of teaching and learning in a safe environment.
Since Tinker, many commentators have recognized the incongruency of
free speech principles and the disciplinary function of public schools.7 6
On the one hand, we want our children to learn to be autonomous decision
makers who express their ideas freely-to explore the powerful tool of free
speech as they move toward adulthood. On the other hand, we must protect
the basic educational mission of the school, including providing an ordered
environment where students and teachers feel safe. The Supreme Court,
applying the Constitution, has struck a balance between student rights to
freedom of viewpoint and administrator rights to discipline and order. Both
public school students and teachers must face challenges in the 1990s that are
very different from those faced by their counterparts in the 1960s. An
administrator concerned about the disruption caused by the silent wearing of
black armbands in 1969 might hardly have imagined the veiled intimidation
which teachers in the 1990s would fear." 7

174. Pyle, 824 F. Supp. at 10.
175. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995).
176. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 78, at 48, which discusses the role of value inculcation
in the public school.
177. See Robert Berkley Harper, School Searches-A Look Into the 21st Century, 13 Miss.
C. L. REV. 293 (1993). The author describes how dramatically the problems facing school
teachers have changed since he taught in the public schools twenty years before. Then, teachers
worried about enforcing the tardiness code or finding gum chewers. Now, teachers are more
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Several lessons emerge from the Lovell conundrum. First, the California
Legislature should amend Section 48950 either to remove high school
students from the purview of the statute or to add limitations on student
speech, as the Supreme Court did in Bethel, for valid educational purposes.
In so doing, the California Legislature should recognize that children's free
speech rights, while not absent, are derivative, and subject to limitation.
Second, a sophisticated constitutional analysis of a Lovell-scenario cannot be
undertaken without reference to the special mission of our schools. The
Legislature's suggestion in Section 48950 that context is irrelevant to free
speech. analysis lacks both analytic sophistication and practical realism.
Finally, courts should be aware of their specific roles when they intervene
in school administrator decisions.
As Judge Noonan noted, a federal judge is far removed in time and place
from a disciplinary action that occurs in a school principal's office.'78 The

Lovell decisions have illustrated that courts should afford local administrators
as much discretion as possible and should intervene only when such
discretion has been abused, either substantively or procedurally. When a
federal magistrate usurps a school administrator's decision to issue a mere
three-day suspension for a statement like Lovell's, the court has "raised the
nightmarish potential" of a federal court being "mired in the role of Dress
Code Board of Appeals" 171--not to mention contravening the sage directive
from our mothers never to talk back to our teachers.
Karen M. Clemes"

frequently faced with dangerous weapons and illegal drugs. Id.
178. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 140805, at *10
(9th Cir. March 29, 1996) (withdrawn).
179. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7, 10 n.2 (D.C. Mass. 1993).
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